JUS  CONNATUM  AND  THE  DECLARATION  OF  THE 
RIGHTS  OF  MAN 

The  famous  lines  in  the  first  part  of  Goethe’s  Faust: 

Vom  Rechte,  das  mit  uns  geboren  ist, 

Von  dem  ist  leider  nie  die  Frage, 

in  which  Mephistopheles  sums  up  his  vitriolic  invectives 
against  the  study  of  jurisprudence  in  general  and  of  positive 
law  in  particular,  have  always  been  interpreted  as  a  reference 
to  the  so-called  natural  law.  Since  the  entire  passage  in  which 
these  lines  occur  is  missing  in  the  Urfaust  but  appears  first 
in  the  Fragment  of  1790,  it  might  be  inferred  that  the  lines 
in  question  originated  during  the  time  of  the  French  Revolu¬ 
tion  when  declamations  about  human  rights  and  natural  law 
were  in  vogue.  We  must  remember,  however,  that  discussions 
of  the  nature,  the  origin  and  the  merits  of  the  jus  naturale 
antedate  both  the  American  and  the  French  Revolution  and 
that  Goethe,  as  a  student  or  law,  doubtless  was  familiar  with 
them.  It  is,  therefore,  not  improbable  that  the  unusual  phrase 
“mit  uns  geboren”  by  which  Goethe  characterizes  the  natural 
law  as  opposed  to  statute  or  positive  law  and  which,  as  we 
shall  see  later,  appears  in  the  adjective  form  “mitgeboren”  in 
the  poet’s  early  writings,  was  either  coined  by  him  or  adopted 
from  current  legal  terminology.  In  either  case,  the  very  use  of 
the  term  discloses  the  poet  as  a  champion  of  the  cause  which 
set  the  later  revolutionary  events  into  motion,  and  as  fully 
conscious  of  the  significance  of  the  idea  of  natural  law  as  one 
of  the  greatest  moving  powers  of  modern  history. 

It  is  a  fact  not  infrequently  overlooked,  that  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  the  lex  naturae  which  plays  so  important  a  role  in  the 
political,  social  and  ethical  development  of  modern  times,  is  a 
product  of  Stoicism  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  Epicureanism, 
the  two  philosophies  of  the  senile  decline  of  antiquity  which 
mark  the  birth  of  individualism.  A  manifestation  of  reason, 
the  great  general  law  which  pervades  the  universe  and  con¬ 
stitutes  the  final  cause  of  all  existence,  the  natural  law,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  stoic  view,  is  identical  with  the  ethical  law  both  as 


MIVERSITY  OF 
i  ;  iNOIS  LIBRARY 
•  '3  ANA-CHAMPAIGN 

r-j,  L:\3TACKS 

2  Goebel 

to  its  origin  and  its  nature.  This  implies  not  only  that  this 
law  which  is  eternal  and  independent  of  human  statutes  con¬ 
stitutes  an  absolute  moral  canon  for  all  men  but  also  that, 
owing  to  its  divine  origin,  it  has  obligatory  force  because  it  is 
a  part  of  human  nature  and  as  such  is  capable  of  apprehension 
and  recognition  by  human  reason  which  itself  had  emanated 
from  the  universal  divine  reason. 

Never  before  in  the  history  of  Greek  thought  had  the 
supremacy  of  reason  and  its  immanent  harmony  with  nature 
been  emphasized  as  it  was  in  the  philosophy  of  stoicism.  Nor 
do  we  find  a  similar  glorification  of  reason  and  its  immanent 
harmony  with  nature  except  during  the  period  of  enlighten¬ 
ment  in  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  influence  which  the  stoic  doctrine  had  upon  the 
development  of  political  ideals  seems  quite  obvious.  From 
the  postulated  rationality  of  the  universe  in  which  every 
thinking  being  participates,  naturally  follows  the  assumption 
of  a  community  of  those  beings.  In  fact,  the  stoics  claim  that 
there  exists  an  impulse  in  all  men  to  form  a  community,  for 
since  all  men  are  subject  to  reason,  they  possess  but  one  right 
and  law,  and  in  obedience  to  this  law  they  work  for  the  interest 
of  all.  No  man  can  live  for  himself  without  living  for  others, 
hence  it  is  a  direct  command  of  nature  that  men  establish  a 
community.  The  latter,  therefore,  develops  from  the  lex 
naturae  according  to  the  stoic  view,  not  vice  versa. 

Moreover,  if  the  human  community  has  for  its  sole  basis 
the  equality  of  reason  in  which  each  individual  shares,  there 
is  no  cause  of  limiting  the  community  to  a  single  people  or 
nation,  for  all  peoples  are  members  of  one  body,  since  nature 
has  formed  all  of  them  from  the  same  material  and  for  the 
fulfillment  of  the  same  purpose.  Or,  as  Epiktetus  has  it:  all 
men  are  brothers  for  all  pray  in  the  same  manner  to  the  same 
father.  It  is  the  idea  of  cosmopolitanism  which  for  the  first 
time  finds  philosophical  expression  in  the  stoic  doctrine,  an 
idea  to  which  again  Epiktetus  gives  concise  utterance  in  the 
sentence:  “Patriam  meam  esse  mundum  sciam  et  praesides 
Deos.” 

That  there  is  in  these  political  conceptions  and  especially 
in  the  idea  of  a  World-State  or  a  universal  league  comprising 
all  nations  a  decided  Utopian  element  there  can  be  no  ques- 


Jus  Connatum  and  the  Rights  of  Man 


3 


y 


tion.  The  ideal  state  which  really  hovered  before  the  mind 
of  the  stoics  has  best  been  described  by  Ed.  Zeller  in  his  history 
of  Greek  philosophy:  “a  state  without  marriage,  family,  temples, 
courts,  schools,  and  money,  a  state,  that  meets  with  no  antago¬ 
nism  on  the  part  of  other  states  because  all  national  limits 
have  been  overcome  by  the  brotherhood  of  all  men.” 

The  similarity  of  this  ideal  of  state  with  the  political  dreams 
of  modern  communists  need  not  be  emphasized.  But  although 
the  words  liberty,  equality,  brotherhood  of  man,  cosmopoli¬ 
tanism  and  rule  of  reason  were  the  slogan  among  the  stoics, 
little  or  nothing  was  done  by  them  to  reform  contemporary 
political  and  social  conditions.  Not  until  the  American 
revolution  and  the  subsequent  political  upheaval  in  France 
was  the  attempt  made  to  translate  the  stoic  ideals  into  reality. 
What  the  stoics  were  not  able  to  realize  themselves,  however, 
they  projected  into  the  past  by  a  clever  combination  of  their 
doctrines  with  the  popular  legends  of  a  golden  age.  According 
to  their  teachings  it  was  during  this  primitive  ideal  period  of 
humanity  that  the  lex  naturae  ruled  supreme.  Positive  law 
owes  its  origin  to  the  subsequent  corruption  of  social  condi¬ 
tions.  The  jus  naturale,  however,  retains  its  original  absolute 
force,  even  then,  and  whenever  it  comes  into  conflict  with  the 
positive  law  the  latter  ceases  to  be  obligatory. 

It  is  generally  known  that  the  stoic  view  of  the  state  and 
the  lex  naturae  together  with  the  political  theories  of  other 
philosophic  systems  were  reproduced  later  by  Cicero,  and 
through  his  writings,  and  through  the  Roman  jurists  of  the 
early  empire,  transmitted  to  the  Middle  Ages.  However, 
before  we  follow  the  later  history  of  the  political  ideas  of 
stoicism,  a  word  concerning  the  political  theories  of  Epicure¬ 
anism  which  also  undergo  a  revival  in  the  course  of  time  will  be 
in  place. 

The  atomistic  and  materialistic  character  of  the  Epicurean 
system  of  thought  is  reflected  most  clearly  in  its  political 
doctrines.  As  the  universe,  according  to  this  philosophy, 
developed  from  the  accidental  collision  of  atoms1  so  human 
society  originated  from  an  accidental  aggregation  of  indi- 

1  “Nullo  cogente  natura,  sed  concursu  quodam  fortuitu.”  Cicero,  De 
natura  deorum,  I.  66. 


4 


Goebel 


viduals  actuated  by  selfish  or  utilitarian  motives.  States  owe 
their  origin  to  a  conscious  agreement  or  contract  among  indi¬ 
viduals  for  the  purpose  of  mutual  advantage  and  self  preserva¬ 
tion.  Previous  to  this  contract  no  law  existed  for  there  is  no 
absolute  and  independent  law  outside  of  that  created  by 
contract.  While  the  stoics  teach  “naturalem  legem  divinum 
esse,  eamque  vim  obtinere  recta  imperantem,prohibentemque 
contraria,”2  Epicurus  defines  the  natural  law  as  follows: 
“justum  natura  est  utilitatis  pactum  ut  neque  invicem  laedamus 
nos  nec  laedamur.”3 

In  accordance  with  these  views  the  Epicurean  ideas  con¬ 
cerning  the  primitive  state  of  the  human  race  differ  essentially 
from  those  of  the  stoics.  There  never  existed  a  golden  age 
such  as  the  latter  and  the  popular  traditions  claim  but,  on  the 
contrary,  at  the  beginning  there  were  only  necessity,  poverty, 
ignorance  and  coarseness  as  Lucretius  tells  us  in  his  poem  “De 
rerum  natura.”  The  history  of  the  human  race  according  to 
him  is  the  history  of  its  gradual  rise  to  a  material,  moral  and 
intellectual  civilization. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  recognize  in  these  views  the  source  of 
political  theories  which  we  meet  again  in  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  and  of  which  Gassendi,  Spinoza  and 
especially  Hobbes  and  Rousseau  are  the  chief  exponents. 
Before  the  radical  rationalism  and  the  materialism  of  the 
Epicurean  philosophy  of  the  state  was  to  be  revived,  however, 
the  political  and  social  theories  of  stoicism  had  already  attained 
a  paramount  influence  as  an  historical  factor.  The  acceptance 
by  the  early  Church  of  the  jus  naturale  as  developed  by  the 
stoics  and  its  fusion  with  essential  tenets  of  Christianity  con¬ 
stitutes,  in  fact,  an  event  of  the  utmost  importance.  Christ’s 
message  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  a  message  of  extreme  religious 
individualism  and  at  the  same  time  of  universality,  contained 
no  definite  precepts  with  regard  to  the  possible  social  and 
political  structure  of  the  ideal  community  governed  by  the 
spirit  of  divine  love  which  gradually  was  to  be  realized  on 
earth.  However,  with  the  formation  of  the  early  Christian 

2  Cicero,  De  natura  deorum ,  I,  14. 

3M.  Voigt,  Das  jus  naturale ,  etc.  I,  131. 


Jus  Connatum  and  the  Rights  of  Man 


5 


congregations  in  which  Christ’s  ideal  found  expression  in  a 
radical  religious  individualism  and  socialism,  a  decided  antago¬ 
nism  to  the  existing  social  and  political  organizations  developed, 
followed  by  long  struggles  with  the  Roman  state.  Although 
these  struggles  finally  ended  in  the  victory  of  the  Church,  i.e., 
in  the  nominal  Christianization  of  the  state,  the  inherent  con¬ 
trast  between  the  Christian  ideal  and  the  traditional  non- 
Christian  institutions  of  society  as  well  as  the  exigencies  of 
actual  life  had  not  been  removed.  To  bridge  it  over  a  compro¬ 
mise  which  would  make  allowance  for  these  exigencies  and 
established  institutions  and  at  the  same  time  preserve  the 
spirit  of  strict  Christianism  seemed  necessary.  This  was 
accomplished  by  the  adoption  and  the  gradual  transformation 
of  the  jus  naturale  as  developed  by  the  stoics  which,  moreover, 
bore  strong  resemblance  to  certain  Christian  views  and  doc¬ 
trines. 

It  is  impossible  here  to  trace  the  history  of  the  new  Chris¬ 
tian  conception  of  the  lex  naturae  resulting  from  the  fusion  of 
stoic  and  Christian  ideals  which  was  to  play  a  remarkable  role 
not  only  in  the  medieval  Church  but  also  in  the  teachings  of 
Luther  and  Calvin.  Emphasis  should  be  laid  upon  the  fact, 
however,  that  while  the  Church  identified  the  lex  naturae  on 
the  whole  with  the  lex  Mosis,  certain  mediaeval  sects  and 
later  certain  protestant  denominations,  especially  the  latter, 
insisted  upon  the  identity  of  the  jus  naturale  as  it  existed  in  the 
status  integritatis  before  the  fall  with  the  divine  law  proclaimed 
by  Christ  in  the  sermon  on  the  mount.  Freedom,  equality, 
community  of  property  and  equal  rights  of  man  and  woman 
constitute  the  original  jus  naturale  and  demand  realization 
in  order  to  bring  about  the  millenium.  The  element  of  political 
ferment  in  this  conception  of  the  jus  naturale  is  obvious,  and 
it  is  here  that  modern  democracy  derives  its  real  origin.  The 
powerful  plea  for  liberty  of  conscience  and  religious  freedom 
first  uttered  by  Luther  and  contained  in  the  Anabaptistic  creed 
as  well  as  in  the  teachings  of  mystics  such  as  Valentin  Weigel 
and  Jacob  Boehme  who,  moreover,  identified  the  inner  light 
with  human  reason  and  the  law  of  nature,  worked  like  a 
leaven  in  Germany,  in  Holland  and  finally  in  England,  where 


6 


Goebel 


during  the  revolution,  their  political  consequences  became 
apparent.4 

Although  a  direct  influence  of  the  lofty  ideas  of  religious 
tolerance  upon  the  rise  of  the  modern,  purely  rationalistic 
doctrine  of  the  jus  naturale  cannot  be  shown,  it  does  not  seem 
to  be  merely  accidental  that  the  latter  developed  contempora¬ 
neously  with  the  claims  of  religious  liberty.  It  is  in  times  of 
social  unrest  and  revolutionary  convulsions  that  the  law  of 
nature  is  evoked,  and  as  the  violent  struggles  to  attain  religious 
freedom  affected  the  whole  of  the  social  body,  the  attempt  at 
a  reconstruction  of  the  jus  naturale  does  not  seem  surprising. 
That  the  basis  of  this  reconstruction  was  found  in  human 
reason  may  be  explained  from  various  causes. 

The  emphasis  which  the  mystic  and  sectarian  circles  laid 
upon  the  identity  of  the  inner  light  with  human  reason  and 
the  law  of  nature  has  already  been  pointed  out.  The  emanci¬ 
pation  of  human  reason  which  lay  hidden  in  this  view  and,  in 
fact,  inaugurated  the  era  of  rationalism  and  “enlightenment” 
made  the  revival  of  stoic  doctrines  in  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
reason  played  a  similar  role  all  the  more  acceptable  and 
plausible.  Moreover,  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  human¬ 
istic  movement  carried  with  it  not  only  a  new  conception  and 
valuation  of  man  and  his  innate  powers,  but  also  a  deeper  and 
more  intense  study  of  ancient  literature  and  philosophy.  This 
led,  of  course,  also  to  a  renewed  interest  in  the  study  of  Roman 
law  and  the  conscious  attempts  of  its  revival  such  as  we  notice 
among  a  number  of  distinguished  French  jurists  during  the 
16th  century. 

The  greatest  impulse  of  the  development  of  the  modern 
doctrine  of  the  jus  naturale  was  given,  however,  by  the  social 
and  political  conditions  of  the  time.  While  the  sway  of  the 
medieval  Church  and  the  Empire  had  practically  been  broken 
by  the  Reformation,  the  autocratic  power  of  the  territorial 
sovereigns,  on  the  other  hand,  was  constantly  increasing,  and 

4  See  Valentin  Weigel,  Kirchen  oder  Hauspostill  (1618)  II,  184:  “Es  ist 
das  angeborne  Licht  in  einem  Jeden,  daraus  alle  Erkenntniss  fleusset.”  E.  D. 
Colberg,  Das  Platonisch-hermetische  Christentum  (1710)  II,  338:  “Gott  hat  in 
alle  Menschen,  auch  Jiiden  und  Heyden  einen  innerlichen  lebendigen  Glauben 
gepflanzet,  darin  offenbaret  er  sich  alien  Volkern  durch  das  Gesetz  der  Natur 
in  der  Liebe,  die  auch  Gott  selber  ist.” 


Jus  Connatum  and  the  Rights  of  Man 


7 


with  it  the  antagonism  of  the  state  to  the  rising  individualism, 
nourished  by  the  religious  movements  and  the  changed  economic 
and  social  conditions  of  the  period.  As  both,  the  sacerdotium 
and  the  imperium,  had  ceased  to  be  the  universal  arbiters,  a 
new  tribunal  was  to  be  found  before  which  the  fierce  contest 
between  religious  freedom  and  coercion,  between  democracy 
and  autocratic  rule  c-ould  be  decided.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
the  jus  naturale  of  antiquity  was  evoked  which  showed  the 
possibility  of  reconstructing  upon  the  basis  of  individualistic 
principles,  both  society  and  state  by  going  back  to  their  very 
origins.  How  widespread  and  deep  the  desire  for  social  and 
political  reconstruction  was  is  evinced,  furthermore,  by  the 
numerous  utopias  produced  during  the  sixteenth  and  seven¬ 
teenth  centuries,  all  of  which  show  traces  of  the  stoic  ideal  of 
the  golden  age. 

It  is,  of  course,  impossible  here  even  to  sketch  the  various 
theories  of  natural  right  as  they  were  developed  by  such  men 
as  Althusius,  Hugo  Grotius,  Pufendorf  and  others  in  Holland 
and  Germany,  and  by  Hooker,  Hobbes,  Locke  and  their 
followers  in  England.  That  the  doctrine  of  the  law  of  nature 
should  have  found  its  earliest  and  most  ardent  champions  in 
these  countries  seems  due  in  no  small  measure  to  the  inera¬ 
dicable  love  of  freedom  of  which  the  early  Germanic  political 
institutions,  as  described  by  Tacitus,  give  ample  evidence.  In 
fact  it  was  the  Tacitean  picture  of  old  Germanic  liberty 
expressed  in  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  that  inspired 
German  poets  and  patriots  in  their  struggles  for  political 
freedom  from  the  sixteenth  century  down  to  the  wars  of 
liberation. 

It  is  significant,  therefore,  that  the  first  attempt  to  con¬ 
struct  the  state  according  to  the  principles  of  the  revived  stoic 
conception  of  natural  law  was  made  by  Johannes  Althusius 
upon  the  basis  of  the  theory  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people. 
A  professor  at  the  German  university  of  Herborn,  which  stood 
in  most  intimate  religious  and  intellectual  relationship  to  the 
Netherlands,  Althusius,  in  the  preface  to  his  famous  book, 
“Politica  methodice  digesta  et  exemplis  sacris  et  profanis 
illustrata,”  points  out  in  eloquent  terms  that  there  was  no 
more  glorious  an  example  of  the  just,  wise  and  strong  realiza¬ 
tion  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  the  central  thought  of 


8 


Goebel 


his  book,  than  the  example  which  the  united  Dutch  provinces 
had  given  to  all  nations  by  freeing  themselves  from  Spain. 
The  close  connection  between  the  great  historical  event  which 
inspired  Althusius  and  the  origin  of  his  political  theories  is  all 
the  more  important  since  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  to¬ 
gether  with  his  doctrine  of  the  social  contract  (contractus 
socialis)  from  now  on  occupy  the  foremost  place  in  the  con¬ 
stantly  increasing  discussions  of  natural  law,  discussions  which 
finally,  as  a  matter  of  logical  consequence  as  well  as  of  imme¬ 
diate  and  pressing  practical  concern,  develop  the  doctrine  of 
the  original  rights  of  the  individual.  While  there  is  no  question 
that  the  demand  for  religious  freedom  furnished  the  first 
impulse  to  the  development  of  this  doctrine,  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  trace  the  declaration  of  the  rights  of  man  directly 
to  religious  causes.  Religious  toleration  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  word  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  incompatible  with  the  idea  of 
orthodoxy  to  which  every  religious  body  must  adhere  as  a 
matter  of  principle.  The  demand  for  religious  liberty,  there¬ 
fore,  means,  within  the  various  sects,  in  reality  the  demand  for 
the  right  of  exercising  some  particular  religion  and  not  the 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  other  religious  bodies  should  have 
the  same  right.  Tolerance,  in  the  latter  sense,  is  the  result  of 
lofty  philosophical  thought,  as  is  found  first  in  mystics  such 
as  Valentin  Weigel  and  Jacob  Boehme  and  later  emphasized 
chiefly  by  philosophers  such  as  Spinoza,  Locke  and  Thomasius. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  religious  liberty  is  listed  comparatively 
late  among  the  rights  of  man  proclaimed  by  the  jus  naturale. 
Least  of  all,  however,  is  there  any  justification  for  the  claim 
that  religious  liberty  was  one  of  the  prime  factors  which 
produced  the  declaration  of  human  rights  by  the  various 
American  colonies.5 

sThe  attitude  of  the  New  England  theocracy  toward  religious  liberty  and 
toleration  is  well  illustrated  by  the  following  quotations: 

Nathaniel  Ward  (1645):  “God  doth  nowhere  in  His  word  tolerate  Chris¬ 
tian  States  to  give  toleration  to  adversaries.” 

“Polypiety  is  the  greatest  impiety  in  the  world.” 

John  Cotton:  “It  was  Toleration  that  made  the  world  anti-Christian.” 

Pres.  Oakes  (1673):  “I  look  upon  Toleration  as  the  first-born  of  all  abomi¬ 
nations.” 


Jus  Connatum  and  the  Rights  of  Man 


9 


There  is,  in  fact,  in  the  various  American  bills  and  declara¬ 
tions  of  rights  not  a  single  right  which  previously  had  not  been 
evolved  theoretically  by  the  leading  advocates  of  the  jus 
naturale.  Liberty  and  equality,  they  had  argued,  are  not  the 
only  rights  postulated  by  natural  law,  but  there  are  others 
which  are  retained  by  man  when  by  an  act  of  free  will  he 
enters  into  the  social  compact.  Too  much  emphasis  cannot  be 
laid  upon  the  principle  of  the  free  will  of  the  individual  entering 
upon  this  compact,  a  principle  which  was  first  introduced  by 
Althusius,  for  upon  it  is  based  not  only  the  conception  of  the 
purpose  of  the  state,  which  is  the  common  good  or  welfare,  but 
also  the  theory  of  the  inalienable  rights  of  man.  In  con¬ 
formity  with  the  stoic  tradition  both  Grotius  and  Pufendorf 
teach  that  according  to  the  law  of  nature  all  men  in  their 
original  state  are  free  and  equal.  Following  Pufendorf,  who 
saw  in  self-preservation  a  fundamental  instinct  of  man,  Locke 
makes  the  preservation  of  property  the  central  idea  of  his 
political  system,  an  idea  which,  in  his  opinion,  includes  also  the 
life  and  liberty  of  the  individual.  This  utilitaristic  emphasis 
upon  property  was  due  in  all  probability  to  the  desire  of 
curbing  the  communistic  tendencies  of  certain  religious  sects 
and  of  securing  for  the  English  middle  classes  the  necessary 
protection  of  their  liberty  and  property  against  possible  future 
government  encroachment  such  as  they  had  experienced  under 
the  rule  of  the  Stuarts.  That  Locke’s  theories,  on  the  whole 
a  revival  of  the  political  doctrines  of  stoicism  and  their  out¬ 
spoken  individualism,  would  appeal  strongly  to  the  American 
colonists  in  their  economic  struggle  against  the  encroachments 
of  the  British  government  goes  without  saying. 

It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  Locke’s  conception  and 
interpretation  of  the  rights  founded  in  the  law  of  nature 
would  as  such  have  lead  to  the  declaration  of  the  rights  of  man 
and  to  the  establishment  of  a  new  government  since  Locke, 
after  all,  considers  the  English  government  as  a  moderate 
monarchy  and  an  especially  happy  embodiment  of  the  con¬ 
stitutional  form  of  the  jus  naturale.  He  even  goes  so  far  as 
to  defend  prerogatives  and  to  speak  of  the  “God-like  English 
princes”  in  a  way  that  smacks  strongly  of  the  divine  right. 
If  the  English  form  of  government  had  really  been  the  model 


10 


Goebel 


state,  in  which  the  rights  of  man  were  secured,  the  American 
colonies  would  have  had  little  reason  to  break  away  from  it. 

What  Locke’s  system  of  the  jus  naturale  was  lacking  in 
particular  and  what  must  have  seemed  of  vital  importance  to 
the  discontented  American  colonists,  was  the  assertion  of  the 
inalienability  of  freedom.  While  one  or  two  sections  of  his 
“Two  Treatises  on  Government”  (II,  23,  95)  seem  to  imply 
this  assertion,  there  are  other  passages  which  state  distinctly 
that  “men  when  they  enter  society,  give  up  the  equality, 
liberty  and  executive  power  that  they  had  in  the  state  of 
nature  into  the  hands  of  the  society  to  be  so  far  disposed  of 
by  the  legislative  as  the  good  of  the  society  shall  require.”  (131) 
The  only  power  which  nobody  can  transfer  to  another  is  the 
power  over  his  own  life.  Whether  the  failure  of  Locke  and  his 
immediate  followers,  Montesquieu  and  Rousseau,  to  recognize 
the  inalienableness  of  freedom  was  due  to  the  illusion  that  the 
democratic  form  of  government  as  such  insured  the  personal 
freedom  of  the  individual,  an  illusion  which  disregards  the 
tyranny  of  majority  rule,  or  whether  it  was  caused  by  Locke’s 
secret  reverence  for  the  hereditary  prerogatives  of  the  British 
crown,  cannot  be  decided  here. 

The  champions  of  the  cause  of  the  colonies,  all  assiduous 
students  of  the  law  of  nature,  which  furnished  them  with  their 
weapons,  had  to  look  elsewhere  for  the  justification  of  severing 
their  allegiance  to  a  government  which,  though  claiming  to 
be  founded  on  the  laws  of  nature,  did  not  recognize  in  its  laws 
the  rights  of  the  individuals  and  denied  them  the  fundamental 
rights  of  this  law.  They  found  this  justification  in  the  basic 
principle  of  the  jus  naturale  laid  down  for  the  first  time  in  the 
system  of  Chr.  Wolff,  according  to  which  the  right  of  freedom 
is  inalienable.  Wolff  arrives  at  this  important  principle  by 
distinguishing  strictly  between  freedom  in  the  original  state  of 
nature  and  freedom  in  the  state  of  society,  and  defines  the 
former  as  jus  connatum  and  as  such  “homini  ita  inhaeret,  ut 
ipsi  auferri  non  possit.”6  This  innate  and  inherent  freedom 
is  not  given  up  by  man  to  the  majority  of  the  community,  as 
Locke  and  others  teach,  but  is  only  restrained:  “Imperium 
civile  cum  metiendum  sit  ex  fine  civitatis,  idem  non  extenditur 

•  Chr.  Wolff:  Institutiones  juris  naturae  et  gentium  (1750),  §  74. 


Jus  Connatum  and  the  Rights  of  Man 


11 


ultra  eas  civium  actiones  quae  ad  bonum  publicum  consequen- 
dum  pertinet;  consequenter  cum  nonnisi  quoad  easdem  libertas 
naturalis  singulorum  restringatur,  quoad  ceteras  actiones  ea 
illibata  manet.”7 

The  extraordinary  esteem  in  which  Samuel  Pufendorf’s 
great  work  “De  jure  naturae  et  gentium”  (1673)  stood  at  the 
end  of  the  seventeenth  and  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
centuries  in  Europe  and  America8  was  second  only  to  the  regard 
in  which  Christian  Wolff’s  rigorously  systematic  and  philo¬ 
sophical  book,  “Institutiones  juris  naturae  et  gentium,”  was 
held  since  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.  “The  aca¬ 
demies  of  Paris  and  London,”  says  Hettner,  “made  Wolff  their 
honorary  member,  and  it  was  indeed  an  hitherto  almost 
unheard  of  event  that  the  scientific  writings  of  a  German  were 
translated  into  nearly  all  living  languages.”  Especially  strong 
was  his  influence  in  France  where  Voltaire  became  an  enthu¬ 
siastic  student  of  his  philosophy,  and  the  Journal  des  Savants, 
the  Histoire  litteraire  and  the  Journal  de  Trevoux  published 
large  extracts  from  his  writings. 

How  soon  Wolff’s  work  on  the  jus  naturale  became  known 
in  America  cannot  be  definitely  stated,  but  the  fact  that 
Vattel’s  book  on  the  Law  of  Nature,  a  famous  popularization 
of  Wolff’s  system,  is  often  quoted  by  John  Adams,  Samuel 
Adams,  Otis,  Jefferson,  Hamilton,  and  others,  goes  to  show 
that  Wolff’s  ideas  had  taken  root  in  this  country  even  before 
his  work  was  translated  into  French  by  E.  Luzac  in  1772. 

There  seems  to  be  no  question  that  as  soon  as  in  the  political 
discussions  the  rights  of  man  are  described  as  inherent  and 
inalienable,  as  is  done  by  James  Otis  in  his  celebrated  speech 
on  the  writs  of  assistance  delivered  in  Boston  in  1761,  the 
influence  of  Wolff  is  evident.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  in  the 
same  speech  Otis  mentions  the  rights  of  mutual  defense  and 
security,  proves  beyond  a  doubt  that  he  knew  Wolff’s  list  of 
jura  connata,  a  catalogue  existing  in  no  previous  author:  “Ex 

7  Ibid.,  §  980. 

8  The  most  striking  example  of  the  influence  which  Pufendorf ,  who  held 
the  first  professorship  of  International  Law  at  the  University  of  Heidelberg, 
exerted  upon  early  American  political  thought  is  the  famous  little  book,  A 
Vindication  of  the  Government  of  New  England ,  published  in  1717  by  John 
Wise,  pastor  at  Ipswich,  Mass. 


12 


Goebel 


hactenus  dictis  patet,  quaenam  sint  jura  hominum  connata, 
nimirum  jus  ad  ea,  sine  quibus  obligationi  naturali  satisfied 
nequit,  sub  quo  comprehenditur  jus  petendi  officia  humani- 
tatis,  et  alterum  sibi  obligandi  ad  ea  perfecte,  aequalitas, 
libertas,  jus  securitatis  et  inde  natum  ius  defensionis  et  jus 
puniendi.”9  It  is  no  wonder  that  John  Adams  shuddered,  as 
he  relates,  to  hear  these  doctrines  whose  import  was  so  far 
reaching,  and  that  he  considered  American  independence  to 
have  been  born  then  and  there. 

It  is  a  most  significant  fact,  hitherto  overlooked,  that 
Wolff’s  Institutiones  Juris  Naturae,  in  Luzac’s  edition  of  1772, 
which  prints  the  Latin  text  opposite  the  French  translation,  was 
owned  by  Jefferson  and  shows  a  mark,  presumably  made  by 
him,  opposite  the  Latin  paragraph  which  treats  of  the  right  of 
civil  war:  “differt  a  rebellione  Bellum  civile  quo  justa  arma 
adversus  Rectorem  civitatis  sumunt  subditi.  Licitum  igitur  est 
in  omni  casu,  in  quo  Rectori  civitatis  resistere  licet.”10  In  the 
last  part  of  the  work  numerous  passages  which  treat  of  war  and 
neutrality  are  marked  by  Jefferson.  While  it  is  impossible  to 
determine  the  exact  year  when  he  purchased  the  book  his  manu¬ 
script  library  catalogue  shows  that  he  possessed  it  previous  to 
March  6,  1783. 

In  view  of  these  facts  it  is  of  great  interest  to  examine  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  with  regard  to  the  possible 
influence  which  Wolff’s  teachings  might  have  had  on  Jefferson, 
That  the  conception  of  the  inalienable  rights,  especially  of  the 
inalienability  of  the  right  of  freedom,  must  be  traced  back  to 
Wolff  has  already  been  pointed  out.  Of  the  three  rights  listed 
by  Locke:  life,  liberty  and  property,  the  Declaration  of  Inde¬ 
pendence  has  only  life  and  liberty,  adding  in  place  of  property 
the  pursuit  of  happiness.  While  the  latter  is  not  contained  in 
Wolff’s  catalogue  of  rights,  it  appears  among  the  objects  for 
which,  according  to  Wolff,  the  State  has  been  constituted: 
“unde  patet,  pacto  hominum  civitates  fuisse  constituendas  et 
finem  civitatis  consistere  in  vitae  sufficienta,  abundantia  eorum 
ad  vitae  necessitatem  commoditatem  et  jucunditatem  requir- 
untur  ac  mediorum  felicitatis.”11  The  omission  of  the  right 
of  property  is  all  the  more  significant,  since  Locke,  as  has  been 
shown  above,  based  the  entire  structure  of  his  system  upon 
this  conception.  Whether  Jefferson,  with  keen  logical  insight, 

9  Ibid.,  §95. 


10  Ibid.,  §  1233. 


11  Ibid.,  §  972. 


Jus  Connatum  and  the  Rights  of  Man 


13 


considered  the  inalienability  of  property  as  debatable  and 
irrelevant  as  far  as  the  great  issue  was  concerned,  or  whether 
he  thought  that  the  Declaration  of  Independence  should  be 
based  upon  an  interpretation  of  the  law  of  nature  different  in 
some  essentials  from  that  of  Locke  and  his  follower,  Black- 
stone,  both  of  whom  were  after  all  loyal  Englishmen,  is  difficult 
to  determine. 

To  justify  the  complete  political  separation  from  England 
and  the  establishment  of  a  new  form  of  government,  an  exposi¬ 
tion  of  the  right  of  resistance  that  could  furnish  the  legal  basis 
for  these  actions  was  necessary.  What  Locke  had  to  offer  as  a 
last  resort  in  this  respect  was  an  appeal  to  Heaven.  Wolff, 
however,  was  far  more  explicit  and  radical  in  his  teachings. 
While  he  concedes  to  the  individual  only  the  right  of  passive 
resistance  against  encroachments  on  his  liberty,  he  declares 
that  the  people  as  a  whole,  by  whose  consent  the  government 
exists,  are  entitled  to  disobey  and  give  active  resistance  when¬ 
ever  their  constitutional  rights  are  infringed,  for  with  the 
breach  of  the  social  compact  the  people  return  to  the  original 
state  of  nature  in  which  each  individual  protects  his  own 
rights  and  the  formation  of  a  new  government  becomes 
imperative. 

That  this  train  of  reasoning  is  also  at  the  bottom  of  Jefferson’s 
arguments  in  support  of  the  contention  that  “it  is  the  right 
and  the  duty  of  the  people  to  throw  off  a  government  designing 
to  reduce  them  under  absolute  despotism  and  to  provide  new 
guards  for  their  future  security”  is  quite  evident.  Nor  can 
the  purpose  of  laying  the  long  list  of  infractions  of  the  rights 
of  the  colonies  directly  at  the  door  of  the  British  king,  the 
Rector  civitatis,12  and  not  of  the  English  Parliament  which,  of 
course,  was  equally  guilty  of  these  infringements,  be  misunder- 

12  The  original  draft  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  reads,  “the 
present  majesty,”  which  Benjamin  Franklin  changed  into  “the  present  King 
of  Great  Britain.” 

As  a  matter  of  historical  interest  it  may  be  mentioned  that  among  “the 
injuries  and  usurpations”  with  which  the  King  of  Great  Britain  is  charged 
there  appears  in  Jefferson’s  original  draft  also  the  following:  “he  is  at  this  time 
transporting  large  armies  of  Scotch  and  other  foreign  mercenaries  to  compleat 
the  works  of  death,”  etc.  Why  t,he  Scotch ,  who  were  evidently  classed  as 
foreigners  with  the  so-called  “Hessians”  by  Jefferson,  were  afterwards  omitted 
has  not  yet  been  explained. 


14 


Goebel 


stood.  Had  Jefferson  adhered  to  the  fiction  of  the  democracy  of 
the  British  government  and  accused  the  Parliament,  his  entire 
argumentation  would  have  collapsed  and  what  he  wished  to  have 
considered  an  uprising  against  tyrrany,  justifiable  by  the  law 
of  nature,  would  have  appeared  an  unwarrantable  rebellion. 

There  is  finally  one  more  vital  point  of  contact  between 
Jefferson’s  Declaration  and  the  system  of  Wolff.  Although 
Locke  had  succeeded  in  reestablishing  the  jus  naturale  of 
stoicism,  his  own  system  lacked  the  metaphysical  foundation 
which  the  stoic  doctrine  possessed  in  the  principle  of  the 
universal  reason,  of  which  the  jus  naturale  is  a  manifestation. 
Without  sacrificing  the  rationalistic  character  of  his  method  or 
of  returning  to  the  theological  explanation  of  the  natural  law 
of  previous  times,  Wolff,  following  Leibniz,  on  the  other  hand, 
declared  that  “autor  legis  naturae  ipse  Deus  est  et  ad  actiones 
suas  eidem  confirmandas  hominem  obligat,  sicque  obligatio 
naturalis  etiam  divina  est  et  lex  naturalis  divina.”13  The 
spirit  of  Deism  which  dictated  this  explanation  of  the  origin 
of  the  law  of  nature  would  naturally  appeal  to  Jefferson  and 
it  is  not  difficult  to  see  how  it  is  reflected  in  the  phrase:  “that 
they  are  endowed  by  their  creator  with  certain  inalienable 
rights.”14  The  jus  connatum  is,  therefore,  in  the  last  analysis 
a  divine  law  and  its  inalienability  follows  from  its  divine 
character. 

By  this  allusion  to  the  divine  origin  of  the  law  of  nature 
the  doctrine  of  the  inalienable  rights  of  man  became  a  message 
whose  inspiring  ring  acted  with  irresistible  force  especially 
upon  the  masses.  What  had  been  slowly  evolved  in  the  quiet 
workshop  of  the  thinkers  and  teachers  now  loomed  in  historical 
reality  by  the  establishment  of  a  democracy  such  as  the  world 
had  not  seen  before. 

The  student  who  follows  the  history  of  natural  law  from 
its  beginnings  among  the  stoics  to  its  consummation  in  the 
declaration  of  the  rights  of  man,  is  impressed  with  the  fact  that 
he  is  face  to  face  with  one  of  the  most  potent  forces  at  the 

13  Wolff,  Institutiones,  §  41. 

14  It  is  most  significant  that  in  the  original  draft  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  Jefferson  intended  to  deduct  the  inalienable  rights  from  the 
equality  of  all  men:  “that  from  that  equal  creation  they  derive  in  rights 
inherent  and  inalienable.” 


Jus  Connatum  and  the  Rights  of  Man 


15 


root  of  the  historical  process  since  the  decline  of  antiquity. 
Determined  in  its  growth  by  great  political  and  social  events, 
the  doctrine  of  natural  law  not  only  accompanies  these  events 
but  also  in  many  instances  furnishes  and  spreads  the  ideas 
which  shape  them.  Its  main  efforts  are  directed  toward  a 
transformation  of  existing  social  and  political  conditions  and 
toward  the  establishment  of  a  new  and  more  desirable  state  of 
human  affairs  in  the  future. 

The  real  motive  power  behind  this  progressive  tendency, 
however,  was  the  exalted  conception  of  nature  as  the  original 
source  of  truth,  goodness  and  right  and,  above  all,  the  ideal  of 
man  and  humanity  which  had  been  carefully  fostered  by 
thinkers  and  poets  ever  since  the  time  of  the  Renaissance,  an 
ideal  which,  moreover,  acquired  a  new  lustre  with  the  dis¬ 
covery  of  the  inalienability  of  the  rights  of  man.15 

The  victory  of  man’s  rights  in  the  political  sphere  was 
therefore  felt  essentially  as  a  triumph  of  humanity.  For  this 
reason  Klopstock,  the  apostle  of  humanity,  hails  the  American 
revolution  with  the  lines: 

Ein  hoher  Genius  der  Menschlichkeit 
Begeistert  dich! 

Du  bist  die  Morgenrote 
Eines  nahenden  grossen  Tages.16 

In  a  later  ode  entitled,  “Der  Freiheitskrieg,”  he  greets  the 
French  Revolution,  before  its  pledges  and  promises  had  been 
broken,  in  a  similar  strain: 

Weise  Menschlichkeit  hat  den  Verein  zu  Staaten  erschaffen, 

Hat  zum  Leben  das  Leben  gemacht.17 

15  An  excellent  illustration  of  the  high  conception  of  nature  which  inspired 
the  advocates  of  natural  law  is  furnished  by  the  following  extract  from  Wolff’s 
dedication  of  his  Institutiones :  “Actionum  humanarum  bonitatem,  aequitatem 
et  rectitudinem  non  facit  hominum  opinio,  quae  stabilis  non  permanet,  nec 
sibi  in  omnibus  consentit,  sed  ut  sint  bonae,  ut  rectae,  id  ab  ipsa  hominum 
natura  venit,  et  in  rerum  essentia  atque  natura  rationem  sufficientem  habet. 
Differt  igitur  ab  opinione  veritas,  quae  aeternitatem  et  sempiternitatem  ab  ipsa 
hominum  atque  rerum  essentia  et  natura  immutabili  trahit  .  .  .  Haec  ratio 
me  permovit,  ut  castum  illud  et  sanctum  jus,  quod  ipsa  natura  inter  homines 
singulos  atque  gentes  constituit,  inconcussum  felicitatis  totius  generis  humani 
fundamendum,  et  ipsa  natura  humana  continuo  nexu  .  .  .  redigerem,”  etc. 

18  Der  jetzige  Krieg  (1781). 

17  Der  Freiheitskrieg  (April,  1792). 


16 


Goebel 


There  is  no  question  that  Goethe,  as  has  already  been 
stated,  while  a  student  of  law  at  Leipzig  and  Strassburg, 
became  intimately  acquainted  with  Wolff’s  system  of  natural 
law  and  his  doctrine  of  the  jus  connatum.  How  deeply  this 
doctrine  impressed  him  can  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  years 
before  the  innate  and  inherent  rights  became  the  political 
watchword  in  America  and  France,  he  made  the  idea  of  con¬ 
genital  origin  his  own  to  express  the  birthright  of  genius  and 
personality.  Hence  the  epithet  “mitgeboren,”  a  direct  trans¬ 
lation  of  connatum,  which  he  employs  to  characterize  the 
endowments  which  nature  has  given  man.  Thus  he  speaks  of 
the  innate  grace  of  true  womanhood  as  “mitgeborner  Anstand” 
and  calls  his  own  destiny  “fatum  congenitum.”  A  striking 
example  of  the  use  he  makes  of  Wolff’s  conception  of  “conna¬ 
tum”  occurs,  moreover,  in  the  dramatic  fragment,  “Prome¬ 
theus,”  of  the  year  1773  in  which  the  young  poet  draws  a 
remarkable  picture  of  the  communio  primaeva,  as  Wolff  and 
others  before  him  call  the  state  of  nature  in  which  men  lived 
before  positive  laws  were  established.  The  similarity  between 
this  picture  and  Wolff’s  description  of  the  original  state  of  man, 
which  is  essentially  that  of  the  stoics,  precludes  the  suggested 
influence  of  Rousseau’s  “Discours  sur  l’inegalite”  (1758),  a 
work  based  wholly  upon  Epicurean  theories  of  the  status 
originarius ,18  It  is  characteristic  of  Goethe’s  early  attitude  of 
indifference  toward  political  questions  that  his  sketch  of  the 
primitive  state  of  man  suggests  the  origin  of  the  right  of 
property  but  in  no  way  alludes  to  the  beginning  of  government. 
What  at  the  time  interested  the  poet  chiefly  was  the  modern 
ideal  of  man  as  a  free  and  self-responsible  being,  personified 
in  Prometheus,  who  defiantly  proclaims  for  himself  and  the 
generation  created  by  him,  the  right  of  shaking  off  the  yoke  of 
servitude  which  the  gods  had  placed  upon  him.  His  former 
religious  faith  has  yielded  to  an  unlimited  self-confidence  that 
recognizes  neither  divine  origin  nor  dependency  upon  the  gods. 
Even  the  inspirations  of  the  godess  of  wisdom,  his  only  friend 
among  the  Olympian  powers,  he  declares  to  be  “mitgeborne 
Harmonien”  to  which  he  alone  has  a  right. 

18  See  F.  Saran,  Goethe’s  Mohamet  und  Prometheus,  Halle,  1914. 


Jus  Connatum  and  the  Rights  of  Man 


17 


The  intimate  relationship  existing  between  the  rebellious 
spirit  of  the  Prometheus  fragment  and  the  insurgent  temper  of 
the  subsequent  revolutionary  movements  was  recognized  by 
Goethe  himself  when,  in  later  years,  he  called  his  Prometheus 
the  “gospel  for  our  revolutionary  youth”  and  “the  priming  of 
an  explosion.” 

It  was  at  the  time  when  the  firsts  bursts  of  thunder  an¬ 
nounced  the  approach  of  the  storm  of  insurrection  against 
tyrannical  oppression  that  Goethe  wrote  the  famous  lines  in 
defense  of  the  jus  connatum  quoted  at  the  beginning  of  this 
paper,  summing  up  in  a  single  epigrammatic  phrase  the  funda¬ 
mental  issue  of  the  great  revolutionary  struggle.  How  deeply 
Goethe  was  affected  by  the  enthusiastic  hopes  which  the 
declaration  of  human  rights  in  America  and  afterwards  in 
France  had  aroused  in  Germany  may  be  seen  from  the  well 
known  passage  in  “Hermann  and  Dorothea”: 

Denn  wer  leugnet  es  wol,  dass  hoch  sich  das  Herz  ihm  erhoben, 

Ihm  die  freiere  Brust  mit  reineren  Pulsen  schlug, 

Als  sich  der  erste  Glanz  der  neuen  Sonne  erhob, 

Als  man  horte  vom  Rechte  der  Menschen,  dass  alien  gemein  sei, 

Von  der  begeisterten  Freiheit  und  von  der  loblichen  Gleichheitl 
Damals  hoffte  jeder,  sich  selbst  zu  leben,  es  schien  sich 
Aufzulosen  das  Band,  das  viele  Lander  umstrickte, 

Das  der  Miissiggang  und  der  Eigennutz  in  der  Hand  hielt. 


O,  wie  froh  ist  die  Zeit,  wenn  mit  der  Braut  sich  der  Brautigam 
Schwinget  im  Tanze,  den  Tag  der  gewiinschten  Verbindung  erwartendS 
Aber  herrlicher  war  die  Zeit  in  der  uns  das  Hochste, 

Was  der  Mensch  sich  denkt,  als  nah  und  erreichtbar  sich  zeigte. 

Da  war  jedem  die  Zunge  gelost,  er  sprachen  die  Greise, 

Manner  und  Jiinglinge  laut  voll  hohen  Sinns  and  Gefiihles. 

Unfortunately  this  glorious  time  did  not  last  long  and  the 
disillusionment  which  the  subsequent  events  in  France  brought 
to  Klopstock  and  other  noble  spirits  of  this  period,  also  seized 
Goethe.  Hence  he  continues  in  “Hermann  und  Dorothea”: 

Aber  der  Himmel  triibte  sich  bald.  Um  den  Vorteil  der  Herrschaft 
Stritt  ein  verderbtes  Geschlecht,  unwiirdig,  das  Gute  zu  schaffen. 

Sie  ermordeten  sich  und  unterdriickten  die  neuen 
Nachbarn  und  Briider. 

Nevertheless  Goethe  did  not  abandon  his  faith  in  the  message 
of  the  rights  of  man,  and  for  his  defense  of  his  mission  as  a  poet 


18 


Goebel 


expressed  in  the  famous  lines  of  Faust,  I.  135  ff.,  he  knows  of 
no  higher  appeal  than  that  of  his  sacred  human  right. 

There  has  been  a  tendency  both  in  Europe  and  in  America 
during  the  last  decades  to  disregard  and  to  disparage  the  law  of 
nature  upon  which  the  declaration  of  our  independence  rests.  But 
no  tyranny,  whether  of  autocracy  or  pseudo-democratic  majority 
rule,  will  succeed  in  smothering  its  immortal  spirit,19  nor  will 
any  philosophic  or  religious  doctrine  destroy  the  innate  belief 
of  man  that  he  carries  the  oracle  of  divine  nature  in  the  secret 
recesses  of  his  soul.  Here  originate  our  conceptions  of  truth 
and  right  and  here  is  born  the  will  to  avenge  nature  when  it 
has  been  desecrated  and  outraged  by  man.  Whenever  the  old 
order  of  things  must  be  demolished  to  inaugurate  a  new  day 
for  humanity,  the  law  of  nature  will  again  be  conjured  and  the 
poet’s  immortal  words  will  come  true: 

Wenn  der  Gedriickte  nirgends  Recht  kann  finden, 

Wenn  unertraglich  wird  die  Last — greift  er 
Hinauf  getrosten  Mutes  in  den  Himmel 
Und  holt  herunter  seine  ewigen  Rechte, 

Die  droben  hangen  unverausserlich 
Und  unzerbrechlich,  wie  die  Sterne  selbst — 

Der  alte  Urstand  der  Natur  kehrt  wieder, 

Wo  Mensch  dem  Menschen  gegeniiber  steht — 

Zum  letzten  Mittel,  wenn  kein  andres  mehr 
Verfangen  will,  ist  ihm  das  Schwert  gegeben. 

Julius  Goebel. 

19  C/.  Jefferson’s  opinion  expressed  in  a  letter  to  James  Madison  (1787): 
“I  hold  it  that  a  little  rebellion  now  and  then  is  a  good  thing  and  as  necessary 
in  the  political  world  as  storms  in  the  physical.  Unsuccessful  rebellions  indeed 
establish  the  encroachments  on  the  right  of  people  which  have  produced  them.” 

.  .  .  Again  in  another  letter  of  the  same  year  he  says :  “God  forbid  we  should 

ever  be  twenty  years  without  such  a  rebellion  [as  Shay’s]  ...  If  they 
[the  people]  remain  quiet  .  .  .  it  is  a  lethargy,  the  forerunner  of  death  to 
the  public  liberty.  .  .  .  What  country  can  preserve  its  liberties  if  their 

rulers  are  not  warned  from  time  to  time  that  their  people  preserve  the  spirit 
of  resistance.” 


V  '■•'7 


mm 


p-7 ._.;  / . 

^v|,  7  . 

7; 


tiv 


